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Abstract—In this paper, the impact of in-band full-duplex
(IBFD) wireless communications on secret key generation via
physical layer channel state information is investigated. A key
generation strategy for IBFD wireless devices to increase the
rate of generated secret keys over multipath fading channels is
proposed. Conventionally, due to the half-duplex (HD) constraint
on wireless transmissions, sensing simultaneous reciprocal chan-
nel measurements is not possible, which leads to a degraded
key generation rate. However, with the advent of IBFD wireless
devices, the legitimate nodes can sense the shared wireless link
simultaneously at the possible cost of a self-interference (SI)
channel estimation and some residual self-interference (RSI). As
we demonstrate, with HD correlated observations the key rate
is upper bounded by a constant, while with IBFD the key rate
is only limited by the SI cancellation performance and is in
general greater than that of its HD counterpart. Our analysis
shows that with reasonable levels of SI cancellation, in the high
SNR regime the key rate of IBFD is much higher, while in low
SNRs, the HD system performs better. Finally, the key rate loss
due to the overhead imposed by the SI channel estimation phase
is discussed.
I. Introduction
The broadcast nature of wireless transmission makes com-
munications over such channels vulnerable to eavesdropping.
The security of communications over these channels is tradi-
tionally ensured by cryptographic schemes. However, physical
layer security mechanisms can provide a strengthened level
of security in communications [1]. In this paper, secret key
generation based on physical channel state information (CSI)
in point-to-point in-band full-duplex (IBFD or FD) wireless
communications is investigated.
The concept of secret key rate for a system of two le-
gitimate nodes sharing some common source of information
(randomness) is developed in [2], where upper and lower
bounds on key generation rate are presented when a public
and error free feedback channel is assumed available. In [3],
the characteristics of a reciprocal wireless communication
channel between a pair of legitimate nodes are suggested as the
source of common randomness. Since then, generating secrecy
keys based on wireless channel characteristics has attracted
much research attention. Some of these works propose to
generate keys relying on the phase of the fading channel [4],
differences of phases between two frequency tones [5], level
crossing in legitimate nodes [6], direct quantization of the
complex channel coefficients [7], and unknown deterministic
parameters estimated by legitimate nodes [8].
In many of the works in this context, Time Division Du-
plexed (TDD) communication is considered. This is due to the
fact that key generation relies on channel reciprocity, which is
assumed valid in TDD scenarios. However, in rich scattering
environments, due to reasons such as the spatial changes of the
legitimate nodes or any scattering medium between them and
also the temporal changes of the channel, the channel sensed
over two consecutive time-slots is not identical. This reveals
that although the channel is inherently reciprocal, in half-
duplex (HD) systems the two legitimate nodes merely observe
correlated channel characteristics (Fig. 1). To overcome this
issue, the authors in [9] introduced a fractional interpolation
filtering framework to enable two HD legitimate nodes to
find what the channel measurements would have been if the
nodes had made simultaneous measurements by the help of a
finite impulse response filtering. The fractional interpolation
is applied to the real non-simultaneous channel measurements
at the two nodes. The extension of [9] in [10] also takes
into account the non-reciprocities caused by different hardware
characteristics. Despite its low secret key generation rate, in
[11] and [12] the channel deep fades are proposed to facilitate
a common source of randomness counting on the fact that such
channel fades can be long enough to be sensed by both nodes.
In this paper, different from the above works, we study the
possible improvements in the secrecy key generation rate by si-
multaneously sensing the channel using IBFD wireless devices
in the presence of residual self-interference (RSI). We present
a scheme for the IBFD pair of nodes to obtain estimates of
the states of their self-interference and direct channels, and
then analyze the resulting secret key generation rate. In this
analysis, we also take into account the non-reciprocity inherent
in sequential wireless channel sensing. The results demonstrate
that FD communications can noticeably boost the secret key
rate in an operationally interesting regime of parameters. The
prior works related to IBFD based secure communication
have not dealt with secret key generation and are mainly
focused on enhancing the secrecy performance of wireless
communications. The effects of artificial noise generation and
active pilot contamination attack on secrecy performance are
studied in [13] and [14], respectively, whereas the effect of
IBFD relays on the secrecy rate is investigated in [15].
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Fig. 1. Received signal strength measurements taken over time. Alice and
Bob’s RSS measurements are not the same, but correlated [16].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some basic
prerequisites on IBFD are provided in Section II. The system
model in both HD and FD cases is described in Section III.
The key rate analysis in both cases are discussed in Section IV.
Section V presents the simulation results and some analysis.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Preliminary: In-Band Full-Duplex Communication
In In-Band Full-Duplex (IBFD or FD), two nodes conduct
a two-way communication over a single wireless channel
simultaneously.
Conventionally, in an HD wireless device, the ratio of the
self-interference (SI) generated by the ongoing transmission
compared to that of the desired signal had made any FD
communication infeasible. This high SI is simply due to the
fact that the SI signal is traveling a much shorter distance
compared to the desired one, leading the desired signal to
be soaked in the SI. However, recently by the advent of
different passive and active suppression mechanisms an FD
wireless device can suppress its own SI strongly enough to
enable simultaneous transmission and reception in a single
frequency band at the same time. However in practice, because
of the many imperfections in the transceiver operation, fully
canceling SI is not possible, and therefore some residuals will
remain, known as RSI. The RSI represents the main obstacle
for a perfect FD communication, and is similar to noise and
essentially uncorrelated with the original transmitted signal.
Among different methods to model the RSI, a zero mean
Gaussian random variable is used in this paper as follows [17]
RSI ∼ CN
(
0, σ2RS I
)
(1)
where σ2RS I is the variance of the RSI signal, and commonly
is a function of the power of the ongoing transmitted signal.
In the given time frame for generating a key in bidirectional
FD operation that is provided in Fig. 2.b, the FD transceivers
need to allocate a portion of the overall time interval to
estimate their own SI channel state information (CSI), cal-
culate the coefficients of the analog SI cancellation circuits,
and calculate the digital SI canceller parameters. This is the
overhead to be paid in the system for making any FD operation
possible [18]. We call this interval as the SI channel estimation
phase.
III. System Model
In our scenario two legitimate nodes, Alice and Bob, wish
to establish a shared secure key based on their shared wireless
fading channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve.
As usually done in the related literature, we assume that, in
addition to the wireless channels among them, the nodes have
access to a public noiseless channel to send side information
in order to agree on a shared key1. Furthermore, we assume
Eve is several wavelengths apart from the legitimate nodes,
which makes its channel independent of that between Alice
and Bob. The wireless channels are assumed to be affected by
Rayleigh fading, but each channel changes in a time correlated
manner, i.e., we assume that two consecutive channel gains,
say h1 and h2 as shown in Fig. 2, are correlated to each other.
A. Half Duplex
Fig. 2a depicts the time frame for key generation process in
the HD case. Each legitimate node sends training sequences
in an intermittent manner to help the other party to estimate
the wireless channel. In the first time interval, T1, Alice
transmits a sequence of training symbols, SA, to Bob. Based
on the received signal, Bob estimates the channel gain, h˜1,B.
In the remaining time interval, T2, Bob transmits SB and Alice
estimates h˜2,A. The real Gaussian channel gains in these two
time intervals are h1 and h2 with zero means and variances
σ21 and σ
2
2, respectively, which are in general the same. As
explained, we assume that h1 and h2 are correlated with
coefficient ρ. In addition, we assume that the channel gain
over the interval that Alice or Bob senses remains fixed, i.e.,
h1 and h2 are fixed during intervals T1 and T2, respectively.
Moreover, we assume that the times T1 and T2 indicate the
number of symbols transmitted in the first and second time
intervals.
Thus, the received signal vectors at Alice and Bob are
YA = h2SB + NA (2)
YB = h1SA + NB (3)
where NA and NB indicate the received noise vectors with iid
zero mean Gaussian distributed elements with variance σ2.
Thus, the estimated channel gains at Alice and Bob become
h˜1,B =
STA
‖SA‖2
YB = h1 +
STA
‖SA‖2
NB (4)
h˜2,A =
STB
‖SB‖2
YA = h2 +
STB
‖SB‖2
NA (5)
During the time interval for key agreement, we assume that
the nodes transmit with powers PA and PB. It can be shown
1Please note that the public noiseless channel assumption could be relaxed,
at the cost of using more sophisticated schemes and of a slight degradation
of the key rate [19]. Such an extension is left as future work.
TAlice sends training Bob sends training
 T1  T2
h1 h2
(a)
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Alice and Bob simultaneously  send their training 
sequence, SA and SB, to each other
 T1  T2
(b)
Fig. 2. Time frame for the key agreement process. HD case (a), and FD case
(b).
that I(h˜1,B; h˜2,A) = I(YB,YA), so YB and YA are sufficient for
key generation (I(.; .) denotes mutual information). In addition,
it is worth noting that h˜1,B and h˜2,A are correlated Gaussian
random variables with variance σ21 +
σ2
‖SA‖2 and σ
2
2 +
σ2
‖SB‖2 and
correlation coefficient ρ.
B. Full-Duplex
Fig. 2b depicts the time frame for key generation in the FD
scenario. In the FD case the two legitimate nodes Alice and
Bob are assumed to be imperfect FD. Note that in the IBFD
case, we also consider the same setting where the channel
takes two values of h1 and h2 over the intervals T1 and T2
in period T . As discussed in Section II, in the first stage of
this diagram, i.e., the first αT symbol blocks, Alice and Bob
estimate their own SI channel and also the analog and digital
canceler parameters in order to enable any FD operation. In
the second stage, thanks to the SI cancellation techniques
initiated in the first stage, they simultaneously transmit training
sequences over the shared wireless channel. This procedure is
depicted in Fig. 3. In addition, it must be noted that, although
in the first stage the nodes try to estimate their SI parameters,
the other party can use the transmitted symbols over the air to
estimate the shared channel. For instance, in the first (αT )/2
period of the first stage, while Alice transmits symbols to
initate its FD capability, Bob can hear the pilots as shown in
Fig. 3a and can try to estimate the channel. The same happens
when Bob transmits. It is worth noting that due to the very
slow changing feature of the SI channel compared to that of
the shared wireless link between legitimate nodes [18] [20],
there is no need to again estimate the SI channel parameters
at the beginning of the T1 interval.
During the first time interval T1 the received signals at
legitimate nodes can be represented as follows, where the
BobAlice
SI channel
h1
(a) First αT/2 training interval dedi-
cated for Alice SI channel estimation
phase.
BobAlice
h1
SI channel
(b) Second αT/2 training interval ded-
icated for Bob SI channel estimation
phase.
BobAlice
SI channel
h1\ h2
SI channel
(c) The rest of the training interval
dedicated for shared channel estimation
phase.
Fig. 3. FD channel estimation steps.
superscript denotes the first time interval
YFD,(1)B = h1S
FD,(1)
A + RSI
(1)
B + N
FD,(1)
B (6)
YFD,(1)A = h1S
FD,(1)
B + RSI
(1)
A + N
FD,(1)
A (7)
and the estimated channels are
h˜1,B =
(
SFD,(1)A
)T∥∥∥SFD,(1)A ∥∥∥2Y
FD,(1)
B = h1 +
(
SFD,(1)A
)T∥∥∥SFD,(1)A ∥∥∥2
(
RSI(1)B + N
FD,(1)
B
)
(8)
h˜1,A =
(
SFD,(1)B
)T∥∥∥SFD,(1)B ∥∥∥2Y
FD,(1)
A = h1 +
(
SFD,(1)B
)T∥∥∥SFD,(1)B ∥∥∥2
(
RSI(1)A + N
FD,(1)
A
)
(9)
where YFD,(1), SFD,(1), RSI(1) and NFD,(1) are the random
variables in T1. We must note that all of them are (T1−αT /2)×1
size vectors. In the αT /2 portion of T1 each node only
estimates the SI parameters, including SI channel and analog
and digital canceler coefficients. In the remaining portion
(T1−αT /2) it will instead sense the shared channel. In addition,
the first αT /2 elements of the RSI vector are zero, since in
the first αT /2 symbol blocks of (T1 − αT /2), the nodes are
operating in HD mode, i.e., they are only sensing, which does
not cause any RSI to the nodes.
Fig. 4. Alice and Bob channel estimations
In the remaining T2 symbol blocks, the received and esti-
mated channels are respectively
YFD,(2)B = h2S
FD,(2)
A + RSI
(2)
B + N
FD,(2)
B (10)
YFD,(2)A = h2S
FD,(2)
B + RSI
(2)
A + N
FD,(2)
A (11)
and
h˜2,B =
(
SFD,(2)A
)T∥∥∥SFD,(2)A ∥∥∥2Y
FD,(2)
B = h2 +
(
SFD,(2)A
)T∥∥∥SFD,(2)A ∥∥∥2
(
RSI(2)B + N
FD,(2)
B
)
(12)
h˜2,A =
(
SFD,(2)B
)T∥∥∥SFD,(2)B ∥∥∥2Y
FD,(2)
A = h2 +
(
SFD,(2)B
)T∥∥∥SFD,(2)B ∥∥∥2
(
RSI(2)A + N
FD,(2)
A
)
(13)
where the vector sizes during the T2 symbol blocks are T2×1.
In addition, it must be noted that the estimated channels in
these periods at the legitimate nodes are noisy versions of
each other.
IV. Secret Key Rate
After channel estimations, the two legitimate nodes have a
common source of randomness to generate secure keys. As
discussed in [2], the upper bound for the key generation rate
is equal to the conditional mutual information between the
estimated channel vectors h˜A and h˜B at the legitimate nodes
of the shared wireless link given Eve’s estimations, i.e., h˜E ,
as follows
RKey = I
(
h˜A; h˜B
∣∣∣ h˜E) (14)
(a)
= I
(
h˜A; h˜B
)
(15)
in this formula (a) follows from the distance assumption
between Eve and the legitimate nodes which makes Eve’s
channel estimates independent of the legitimate nodes’.
For key agreement, the legitimate nodes exploit Slepian-
Wolf source coding in the information reconciliation step. In
fact, due to the estimation errors the two nodes cannot agree on
a single key in one time slot, consequently one of them should
transmit side information through a noiseless channel to help
the other party in order to eliminate any mismatch in the final
generated key [19]. This noiseless channel, which can be heard
by every node in the network, including Eve, is known as
public channel. In the information reconciliation stage, Alice
(Bob) transmits H(YA|YB) (or H(YB|YA)) bits of information
using Slepian-Wolf coding through the public channel. These
bits, although observable by Eve, do not leak any information
about the key.
A. Half Duplex Shared Key Rate
In the HD case, Alice and Bob have two correlated estima-
tions of the channel as h˜A = h˜2,A and h˜B = h˜1,B. Thus based
on (15) it can be shown that the key rate would be
RKey,HD =
1
T
I
(
h˜1,B; h˜2,A
)
=
1
2T
log

(
σ21 +
σ2
PAT1
) (
σ22 +
σ2
PBT2
)(
σ21 +
σ2
PAT1
) (
σ22 +
σ2
PBT2
)
− ρ2σ21σ22
 (16)
Where ρ indicates the correlation coefficient between the two
estimated channels at nodes A and B, namely h˜1,B and h˜2,A. In
an ideal case of channel estimations, where the nodes estimate
the channel simultaneously, we would have ρ = 1 and the
result would become the same as indicated in [19].
B. In-Band Full-Duplex Shared Key Rate
In the FD case, Alice would have its own observation of
the shared channel as a vector h˜A =
(
h˜1,A, h˜2,A
)
and Bob
would have h˜B =
(
h˜1,B, h˜2,B
)
. Based on the system model
h˜i,A and h˜i,B are noisy versions, while h˜i,A\B and h˜i,(A\B) are
correlated versions of each other. Here, i ∈ {1, 2} and i is
the complement of i. The diagram showing these relations
between estimated channels at two nodes is shown in Fig. 4,
consequently, the key rate generation in this scheme according
to (15) is
RKey,FD =
1
T
I
(
h˜1,A, h˜2,A; h˜1,B, h˜2,B
)
. (17)
In the symmetric scenario, i.e., PA = PB = P, T1 = T2, the
key rate is computed as in (24), where T = T1 +T2. The proof
is provided in Appendix B.
V. Numerical Results and Analysis
To investigate the impact of FD operation on the secure
key rate generation via fading channels we conducted a few
numerical simulations. In the simulations, the transmit powers
and RSI variances are normalized to the noise level, i.e., σ2 =
1, and for a fair comparison, the transmit power of the nodes
in FD is half of that in HD.
In Fig. 5 we compare the key rate in both FD and HD cases
as a function of the correlation coefficient of the estimated
channels. We set T1 = T2 = 2.5 seconds, SNRA = PAσ2 =
SNRB = PBσ2 = 10 dB, σ
2
RS I,A = σ
2
RS I,B = 0 (perfect FD),
α = 0.35, and σ21 = σ
2
2 = 5 dB. It can be seen from the figure
that for small values of the correlation coefficient (ρ → 0)
the HD key rate decreases dramatically, while the FD key rate
not only does not decrease but even increases. This is due to
the fact that in the less correlated scenarios the FD devices
sense a more sharply changing channel, and consequently can
exploit this additional random shared source to generate the
key while in the HD case the less correlated channels mean
losing the shared random source for key generation purposes.
Fig. 5. Key rate versus estimated channels’ correlation coefficient
Fig. 6. Key rate versus SNR for different correlation coefficients
Moreover, in the very highly correlated scenarios, ρ→ 1, the
FD case will lose key rate compared to HD, since in this case
FD devices need to estimate SI channel parameters (α = 0.35)
while the random sources available at both FD and HD devices
are the same.
In Fig. 6 we plotted the key rate as a function of the
transmission power, for different correlation coefficient in both
FD and HD cases. We set σ2A,FD = σ
2
B,FD = σ
2 = 0 dB, i.e.,
the RSI signal is as strong as the noise. From the figure, it can
be seen that in high SNR regime the HD key rate tends to a
constant which, based on (16), is 1T log(
1√
1 − ρ2 ). Evidently,
for ρ 6= 1, which is the case in HD mode, this would be the
main limitation of secrecy key generation. However, for the FD
case, as shown, the higher the SNR the better the key rate. In
addition, similar to Fig. 5, the less the correlation coefficient
the higher the key rate.
It is worth noting that even in the FD case, if the SNR
increases dramatically the key rate will tend to a constant.
This is due to the fact that the RSI channel variance, σ2RS I , and
consequently also σ2FD, are functions of the transmit power of
the FD device, thus if P→ ∞ then σ2FD → ∞, which leads to
a constant ratio, i.e., σ
2
FD
P → η, and consequently would cause
the FD key rate to approach a constant as P → ∞. However
for reasonable SI cancellation, as reported in Fig. 6 in high
SNRs, the better gain is expected in the FD case.
Finally, as seen from Fig. 6, in low SNRs, and highly cor-
related channel observations (ideal case of reciprocal channel
measurements, ρ → 1), the FD key rate is less than the HD
counterpart. This rate loss is due to the RSI and SI channel
estimation phase overheads imposed to the FD systems, while
the randomness sources available in both FD and HD cases
are the same.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the impact of IBFD wireless
communication on the performance of secret key generation.
A simple framework to generate keys based on FD devices is
proposed and is shown to enhance the key rate compared to its
HD counterpart by considering the non-reciprocity inherent in
channel measurements. In addition, in high SNRs, it is shown
that the HD rate tends to a constant when the legitimate nodes
have correlated observations, while for the FD case it would
tend to a rate which is a function of the SI cancellation perfor-
mance. However, in reasonable SI cancellation performance,
i.e., when the RSI and the noise are comparable, the FD key
rate is much higher than that of HD. The high performance of
the FD case is due to the fact that although FD devices should
tolerate some overheads like RSI and the SI channel estimation
phase, they would have both correlated and noisy versions
of the estimated channels, which will provide an additional
source of randomness to generate the key.
A possible extension of this work would be to explore how
the individual time-frames in the proposed scheme for self-
interference channel estimation and direct channel estimation
may be optimized in light of the associated practical require-
ments. Other directions of interest include considering more
sophisticated schemes to enable key agreement without the
need for a noiseless public channel and/or defining imperfect
FD relays to achieve multiplexing gain for the generated key
in line with what is proposed in [19].
Appendix
Define the estimated channel vectors at Alice and Bob as
h˜A =
(
h˜1,A
h˜2,A
)
, h˜B =
(
h˜1,B
h˜2,B
)
(19)
The key rate in this case is RKey,FD = 1T I
(
h˜A; h˜B
)
. Since
h˜A and h˜B are multivariate Gaussian distributed, the mutual
information can be found as follows [21]
RKey,FD =
1
T
I
(
h˜A; h˜B
)
=
1
2T
log

∣∣∣Ch˜A,h˜A ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Ch˜B,h˜B ∣∣∣
|C|
 (20)
where Ch˜i,h˜i for i ∈ {A, B} indicates the covariance matrix
of h˜i, and C =
[
Ch˜A,h˜A Ch˜A,h˜B
Ch˜B,h˜A Ch˜B,h˜B
]
. In (20), |.| indicates the
determinant operator. According to the estimated channel gains
RKey,FD =
1
2T
× log

((
σ21 +
2σ2A,FD
P(1−α)T
) (
σ22 +
2σ2A,FD
P(1−α)T
)
− ρ2σ21σ22
) ((
σ21 +
2σ2B,FD
P(1−α)T
) (
σ22 +
2σ2B,FD
P(1−α)T
)
− ρ2σ21σ22
)
(
2σ2B,FD
P(1−α)T
)2 {[
σ21
(
1 +
σ2A,FD
σ2B,FD
)
+
2σ2A,FD
P(1−α)T
] [
σ22
(
1 +
σ2A,FD
σ2B,FD
)
+
2σ2A,FD
P(1−α)T
]
− ρ2σ21σ22
(
1 +
σ2A,FD
σ2B,FD
)2}
 (24)
C =

σ21 +
σ2RS IA
PB(T1−2αT ) +
σ2
PB(T1−αT ) ρσ1σ2 σ
2
1 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2 +
σ2RS IA
+σ2
PBT2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
σ21 ρσ1σ2 σ
2
1 +
σ2RS IB
PA(T1−2αT ) +
σ2
PA(T1−αT ) ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2 ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2 +
σ2RS IB
+σ2
PAT2

(25)
|C| =
 2σ2B,FDP (1 − α)T
2 ×

σ21
1 + σ2A,FD
σ2B,FD
 + 2σ2A,FDP (1 − α)T
 σ22
1 + σ2A,FD
σ2B,FD
 + 2σ2A,FDP (1 − α)T
 − ρ2σ21σ22
1 + σ2A,FD
σ2B,FD
2
 (26)
in FD scenario, provided in Section III-B, the covariance
matrices are as follows
Ch˜A,h˜A =
 σ21 +
σ2RS IA
PB(T1−2αT ) +
σ2
PB(T1−αT ) ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2 +
σ2RS IA
+σ2
PBT2
 (21)
Ch˜B,h˜B =
 σ21 +
σ2RS IB
PA(T1−2αT ) +
σ2
PA(T1−αT ) ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2 +
σ2RS IB
+σ2
PAT2
 (22)
Ch˜A,h˜B = C
T
h˜B,h˜A
=
[
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
]
(23)
The key rate in the FD case, RKey,FD, can be found by
replacing the determinant of matrices (21), (22), and (25) into
(20). Due to the symmetric matrix C, by doing algebraic row
and column operations the determinant can be found more
easily as in (26). Thus, the key rate in FD case is as in (24),
where in this relation σ2FD = σ
2
RS I + σ
2.
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